The Methodology of Political Theory by List, Christian & Valentini, Laura
 1 
The Methodology of Political Theory 
Christian List and Laura Valentini* 
(forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology) 
Abstract: This article examines the methodology of a core branch of 
contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. 
After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political 
science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the 
analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and 
theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing 
such principles and theories (e.g., the reflective-equilibrium method), for 
the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent 
debate on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and 
assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The 
discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of 
science. 
Political theory, sometimes also called “normative political theory”, is a subfield of 
philosophy and political science that addresses conceptual, normative, and evaluative 
questions concerning politics and society, broadly construed. Examples are: When is a 
society just? What does it mean for its members to be free? When is one distribution 
of goods socially preferable to another? What makes a political authority legitimate? 
How should we make collective decisions? What goals should our policies promote? 
How should we trade off different values, such as liberty, prosperity, and security, 
against one another? What do we owe, not just to our fellow citizens, but to people in 
the world at large? Is it permissible to buy natural resources from authoritarian 
governments? Can war ever be just? 
Political theory is a long-established field. Its questions have animated thinkers since 
Classical Antiquity. Consequently, the methods of theorizing and substantive 
conclusions are diverse. In this article, we review the methodology of a core branch of 
contemporary political theory: the one commonly described as “analytic” political 
theory.  
Given space constraints, we are not able to cover the history of political thought, the 
study of ideologies, the comparative study of political thought across cultures, and 
“continental” political theory, including “hermeneutic”, “post-structuralist”, and 
“post-modernist” approaches (for a more comprehensive discussion, see Leopold and 
Stears 2008). Nonetheless, the label “analytic” should not be interpreted narrowly. It 
is meant to refer to an argument-based and issue-oriented, rather than thinker-based 
and exegetical, approach that emphasizes logical rigour, terminological precision, and 
clear exposition. The term “analytic” is not intended to refer only to the logical and 
linguistic traditions of philosophy associated with the Vienna Circle and philosophers 
in Oxford and Cambridge in the first half of the 20th century. Contemporary analytic 
political theory goes well beyond conceptual analysis. At least since the publication of 
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John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971/1999), the development of normative theories 
has been one of the field’s central concerns.   
This review is structured as follows. In Section 1, we briefly demarcate the scope of 
political theory. In Section 2, we comment on the analysis of political concepts. In 
Section 3, we introduce the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from 
concepts. In Section 4, we discuss the methods of assessing such principles and 
theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. In Section 5, we review a 
recent debate on how abstract and idealized political theory should be. In Section 6, 
finally, we discuss the significance of disagreement in political theory.  
One clarification about the nature of this review is needed. Although we cover 
established ground, we do so from an angle that will be somewhat unfamiliar to at 
least some political theorists – namely an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. 
We have chosen this angle with a view to systematizing the activity of analytic 
political theorizing so as to make its connections with other fields of philosophy and 
positive science more transparent. This seems appropriate in the context of a 
handbook on philosophical methodology. 
1. The scope of political theory 
To demarcate the scope of political theory, it is helpful to distinguish it from its most 
closely related neighbouring fields: political science, moral philosophy, legal theory, 
normative economics, and social ontology. We also offer some comments on the use 
of the label “political theory”, as opposed to “political philosophy”. 
1.1 Political theory and political science 
Political theory can easily be distinguished from (positive) political science. Political 
science addresses empirical and positive questions concerning politics and society 
(for an overview, see Goodin 2009). It seeks to describe and explain actual political 
phenomena, such as elections and electoral systems, voter behaviour, political-
opinion formation, legislative and governmental behaviour, the interaction between 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state, and the stability or 
instability of different forms of government. Political theory, by contrast, addresses 
conceptual, normative, and evaluative questions, such as what a democracy is, how 
we ought to organize our political systems, and how to evaluate the desirability of 
policies.  
Political theory and political science can complement each other. Normative 
recommendations and evaluations of policies or institutional arrangements often rest 
on empirical premises. It is hard to arrive at a blueprint for a just society, for example, 
without understanding how society actually works, since normative recommendations 
may have to respect feasibility constraints (e.g., Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). 
Thus political theory requires political science and the social sciences more generally. 
Similarly, when political scientists investigate, for instance, whether democracy 
promotes economic development or whether free societies are more politically stable 
and less corrupt than unfree ones, they need to know what counts as a democracy or 
how to define freedom. These questions require the conceptual input of political 
theorists. Finally, among the large number of empirical questions that political 
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scientists could investigate, some are undoubtedly more interesting, relevant, and 
pressing than others, and political theory can help shape the research agenda. 
1.2 Political theory and moral philosophy 
While there is a natural division of labour between political theory and political 
science, the distinction between political theory and moral philosophy is subtler. 
Some scholars view political theory as a subfield of moral philosophy, in which the 
concepts and principles from moral philosophy are applied to political – and, more 
broadly, social – problems. If one views political theory in this way but also does not 
want it to collapse completely into moral philosophy, one must give a clear criterion 
of when a problem counts as “political”.  
Unfortunately, this is not straightforward. For instance, saying that a problem is 
political if it involves multiple people or their living together may seem plausible, but 
is too inclusive. Many problems in personal ethics, such as how to treat one’s 
relatives or friends, would count as political on this criterion, even though they are not 
generally classified in this way. On the other hand, saying that a problem is political if 
it involves the state or government is too restrictive, because a number of problems 
outside the sphere of the state or government narrowly construed might still be seen 
as political.  
Consider, for instance, gender relations in civic life or in the workplace, which many 
people regard as a political issue. The question of whether, and how, a distinction 
between the private or personal domain and the political or social one can be 
meaningfully drawn is controversial. Some feminist thinkers have famously 
challenged the possibility of drawing any such distinction and have endorsed the 
slogan “the personal is political” (for an overview, see Baehr 2013). In sum, if one 
wanted to distinguish political theory from moral philosophy by referring solely to the 
substantive domain of problems addressed, one could at best use some heuristic 
criterion to capture a conventional distinction, but this would yield no principled line.   
Another way to distinguish political theory from moral philosophy is to invoke the 
conditions of theorizing in each field. The aim of moral theorizing, one might say, is 
to come up with the correct solution to any given moral problem simpliciter – the 
solution that, based on the theorist’s comprehensive moral view, is right. The aim of 
political theory, one might argue, is different. The political theorist, at least under 
modern conditions, is engaged in problem solving under a particular constraint: the 
presence of pluralism and disagreement about how to solve the problem at hand (see 
Rawls 1996; Waldron 1999). Thus any compelling solution to the problems of 
political theory, such as how to define justice or how to design a legitimate procedure 
for collective decision-making, must appeal to people with a variety of (reasonable) 
viewpoints, precisely because those solutions are meant to apply to, and be acceptable 
in, pluralistic societies.  
If we use such a methodological, rather than substantive, criterion for distinguishing 
political theory from moral philosophy, we need not worry about identifying a 
particular domain of problems that counts as political. Rather, we can say that the 
hallmark of political theory is its mode of theorizing, against the background of 
(reasonable) pluralism. We return to this idea in Section 6, where we discuss the 
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significance of disagreement in political theory. Of course, substantive and 
methodological criteria for distinguishing political theory from moral philosophy can 
be combined. 
1.3 Political theory and legal theory 
We now turn to the relationship between political theory and legal theory. The two 
overlap, and it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between them. We might again 
arrive at a rough distinction by using some heuristic criterion to identify what counts 
as “legal” or “related to the law”. As with the attempt to distinguish the “political” 
from the “private” or “personal”, however, we cannot expect any such criterion to 
yield a definitive distinction.  
Alternatively, we might try to distinguish political theory from legal theory by 
identifying different modes of theorizing associated with each field. For instance, an 
argument to the effect that justice simpliciter requires respect for human rights and 
certain universal welfare protections is distinct from an argument to the effect that a 
particular constitution or kind of legal system, properly interpreted, requires them. 
One might say that the former argument belongs to political theory, the latter to legal 
theory (see the discussion of the nature of legal interpretation in Dworkin 1986).  
More generally, one might say that the deontic concepts used in legal theory, such as 
legal permissibility, legal rights, and legal obligations, are different from their 
counterparts in political or moral theory and therefore require a different analysis.1 
Still, political theory and legal theory are best seen as overlapping fields of enquiry. 
1.4 Political theory and normative economics 
Political theory also overlaps with normative economics, especially with social choice 
and welfare theory. Social choice and welfare theory is the formal, but also normative 
and evaluative, study of (i) collective decision-making procedures, (ii) mechanisms 
for allocating benefits and burdens in society, and (iii) methods by which a social 
planner, policy maker, or institutional designer can assess the goodness or desirability 
of different social states, policies, or institutions. Normative economists investigate 
these – (i), (ii), and (iii) – by introducing desiderata that any reasonable procedure, 
mechanism, or method is required to satisfy and then asking which procedures, 
mechanisms, or methods, if any, satisfy the given desiderata. (For a survey, see List 
2013.)  
The substantive questions addressed in social choice and welfare theory are similar to 
some of those addressed in political theory. For example, questions such as how to 
distribute benefits and burdens are addressed by political theorists and normative 
economists alike. Indeed, Rawls’s Theory of Justice was, in part, influenced by the 
normative works of economists such as Kenneth Arrow (1951), John Harsanyi (1955), 
and Amartya Sen (1970). Similarly, normative economists frequently draw on moral 
and political theory. For example, John Roemer’s (1998) formal work on distributive 
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justice is influenced by G. A. Cohen’s (1995) work in political theory; and the work 
on variable-population social choice by Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and 
David Donaldson (2005) is influenced by Derek Parfit’s (1984) work on population 
ethics.  
Arguably, the main difference between political theory and social choice and welfare 
theory is not a substantive one (although the former is broader than the latter), but a 
methodological one. Mainstream political theory is a non-formal discipline, making at 
most limited use of formal methods from mathematics, logic, and economics, while 
social choice and welfare theory is predominantly formal.  
1.5 Political theory and social ontology 
A less well-known but growing field in the neighbourhood of political theory is social 
ontology. Social ontology investigates the nature of phenomena such as joint 
intentions, collective actions, social norms and conventions, group agency, and 
institutions (e.g., Gilbert 1989; Pettit 1993; Searle 1995; Bratman 1999; Tollefsen 
2002; Tuomela 2007; List and Pettit 2011). Its central question, roughly speaking, is: 
What are the building blocks of the social world, and how are they related to one 
another, to the individuals involved, and to the physical world?  
The substantive questions in social ontology are distinct from those in political theory 
and in some respects prior to them. Social ontology is primarily a positive and 
explanatory field rather than a normative or evaluative one. Its relevance to political 
theory lies in the fact that political theory cannot get off the ground unless we are 
clear about what entities and properties exist in the social world. For example, before 
we can answer questions about rights, obligations, and responsibilities, we need to 
know what entities can be the bearers of rights, obligations, and responsibilities. Are 
these restricted to individuals, or do they also include certain collectives? Should we 
regard the state as an agent, as a mere collection of individuals, or as some kind of 
special fiction? Similarly, before we can answer the question of what is or is not 
socially desirable, we need to know what the possible objects of value might be. It is 
difficult to determine, for instance, whether there should be any cultural rights or state 
subsidies for cultural activities unless we can give at least a partial answer to the 
question of what we mean by “culture”.  
Since different social-ontological theories give us different accounts of what entities 
and properties there are in the social world, they can, in turn, impose constraints on 
what the possible objects of analysis in political theory might be. 
1.6 Political theory and political philosophy 
Although some scholars distinguish between political theory and political philosophy, 
this is mainly a conventional distinction. It refers, roughly, to the different styles of 
political theory conducted in political science and philosophy departments, 
respectively, especially in North America. (In the UK, much of what is conventionally 
called “political philosophy” is traditionally conducted in political science 
departments.) Arguably, “political theory” is the slightly more inclusive and 
interdisciplinary label, referring not only to philosophical work but also to a variety of 
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other approaches. As mentioned, here we focus specifically on the analytic branch of 
political theory. 
2. Concepts in political theory 
A long-standing concern in political theory is the analysis of political concepts: 
freedom, equality, justice, authority, legitimacy, democracy, welfare, and so on. Each 
of these has been interpreted and defined in numerous ways, and political theory can 
help us clarify the advantages and disadvantages of different interpretations and 
definitions. The bulk of political theory in the decades prior to the publication of 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice was conceptual analysis.2 
The analysis of political concepts is relevant not only to normative theory building 
(e.g., any theory of liberalism must employ some concept of liberty) but also, as 
already noted, to positive work in political science. Thus conceptual analysis is, in 
some sense, the least normative or evaluative part of political theory.  
Of course, when we analyze concepts such as freedom and democracy, we are usually 
interested in the kinds of freedom and democracy that we find valuable or 
normatively required. Hence the ultimate motivation for our analysis may well be a 
normative or evaluative one: we may wish to clarify these concepts in order to 
express normative or evaluative principles in terms of them. Logically, however, the 
question of how to understand freedom and democracy is distinct from the question of 
whether freedom and democracy so understood are valuable. Indeed, political 
scientists may sometimes be interested primarily in whether freedom or democracy 
can serve as independent variables in explanations of political phenomena (e.g., when 
they investigate whether freedom promotes prosperity or whether democracies are 
less prone to fighting wars against one another), irrespective of any considerations of 
value.3 In this section, we introduce some key ideas relevant to the analysis of 
political concepts. 
2.1 What is a concept? 
We use concepts to categorize or classify objects.4 The concept democracy, for 
example, may help us distinguish between those forms of government that are 
democratic and those that are not. The concept legitimacy, in relation to acts of state 
coercion, may help us distinguish between those acts of state coercion that are 
legitimate and those that are not.   
                                                
2 For a classic work on political concepts, see Oppenheim (1981). 
3 Of course, political scientists may also consider freedom or democracy as dependent variables, such 
as when they ask which social and economic conditions promote each. Think, for instance, of the 
literature on the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996). In such 
studies, considerations of value may plausibly affect our choice of interpretation of the relevant 
concepts. 
4 We here cannot discuss the ontological status of concepts, on which there are several rival views in 
philosophy. Instead, we rely on a relatively simple characterization of concepts, emphasizing the fact 
that we use concepts to categorize or classify objects and that they serve as ingredients in the activity of 
political theorizing. For a broader discussion of concepts as the constituents of thoughts, see Margolis 
and Laurence (2012). For a cognitive-science treatment of concepts as locations or regions within 
“conceptual spaces”, see Gärdenfors (2000). 
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For the purposes of this article, we assume that any concept has a domain of 
application. This is the set of objects of which it is meaningful to ask whether they 
fall under the given concept or not. We might say, for example, that the domain of the 
concept democracy is the set of all systems of government or decision-making. For 
any object in that set – i.e., any system of government or decision-making – we can 
meaningfully ask whether it is democratic or not. By contrast, for objects outside that 
domain, it is not meaningful to ask whether they are democratic or not. It makes no 
sense to ask, for instance, whether an equilateral triangle or a mountain is democratic 
or not (cf. Dworkin 1986, 75). Note that the domain of the concept democracy – or 
justice, or freedom, and so on – can be variously specified; we return to that point 
below. 
Further, any “classically well-behaved” concept has defining conditions. These 
determine, for any object in the concept’s domain, whether that object falls under the 
concept (“satisfies it”) or not. In our example, the question of whether a particular 
system of government or decision-making, say the political system of Iceland, is 
democratic or not depends on a variety of features of that system: how decisions are 
made, who participates in those decisions, how the participants provide their input, 
how the decisions are implemented and by whom, and so on.  
Philosophers are divided over the extent to which concepts in general have defining 
conditions (for a review, see, e.g., Margolis and Laurence 2012). Many of our 
common-sense concepts arguably lack such conditions. We may be able to pick out 
some paradigm instances (or “prototypes”) of redness or beauty, but may be unable to 
arrive at clear-cut necessary and sufficient conditions that an object must satisfy to be 
red or beautiful (for a related discussion, see Dworkin 1986, chap. 2). By contrast, in 
theoretical work, it is usually desirable to look for concepts with defining conditions. 
Occasionally, however, some theoretical concepts may be regarded as undefined 
“primitives” or as characterizable only through “prototypes”. 
Finally, a concept’s extension is the subset of the domain consisting of precisely those 
objects that fall under the concept (“that satisfy it”). If the concept has defining 
conditions, these determine the extension. The extension of the concept democracy is 
the set of all those systems of government or decision-making that, according to the 
concept, count as democratic. More generally, there can be “non-binary” concepts, 
which do not subdivide objects into those falling under the concept and those not 
falling under it, but which instead classify objects on one or several dimensions that 
may each admit of degrees. For example, equality and welfare are non-binary 
concepts. The level of equality or inequality in a particular distribution of goods is a 
matter of degree, and different interpretations of equality give us different accounts of 
when one distribution counts as more equal than another (see, e.g., Sen 1980). 
Similarly, a person’s welfare is a matter of degree and, on some accounts, even given 
by a vector of multiple attributes, representing different dimensions or aspects of 
welfare. Sen (1987) has argued for the “constitutive plurality” of the concept standard 
of living; there are multiple dimensions on which a person’s standard of living can be 
categorized. 
For practically any salient concept in political theory, there are debates about what the 
domain of application is, what the defining conditions, if any, are, and which objects 
belong to the concept’s extension and which do not. Just think of the many different 
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ways in which the concept democracy may be understood. The domain of application 
may be specified in a variety of ways: for example, as a set of voting procedures, as a 
set of decisions, or as a set of entire political systems. Similarly, we may be divided 
over the defining conditions that determine whether something is democratic or not: 
for example, do only formal, constitutional features of the political system matter, or 
are features of actual political practices relevant as well, and if so, how? And is 
democracy precisely definable at all? In consequence, we may end up with different 
extensions of the concept democracy (see, e.g., Christiano 2008; List 2011). Similar 
considerations also hold for other key political concepts, such as justice, freedom, 
equality, and legitimacy. Indeed, many political concepts are what political theorists 
call “essentially contested” (Gallie 1955). 
2.2 Concepts and conceptions 
Political theorists, following Rawls, who in turn follows H.L.A. Hart, sometimes 
distinguish between concepts and conceptions (Rawls 1971/1999, 5). Concepts, in 
that terminology, are less fully specified than conceptions. For example, we may have 
a broadly outlined concept of freedom as the absence of constraints on agents’ 
actions, which still leaves open what kinds of constraints, agents, and actions matter 
(MacCallum 1967). A full specification of those constraints, agents, and actions 
yields a precise conception of freedom. Different conceptions can thus be compatible 
with the same broad concept.  
We can translate the distinction between concepts and conceptions into our earlier 
terminology by defining a conception exactly as we defined a concept in the last 
section, where the domain, defining conditions (if any), and extension are fully 
specified, and redefining a concept as a broader family of such conceptions, with 
some aspects of the domain, defining conditions, or extension left open. 
2.3 Desiderata on concepts  
The following is a list of desiderata that systematize requirements often implicitly 
employed by political theorists engaging in conceptual analysis:  
Respecting our intuitions: We may want to interpret a concept, such as freedom or 
democracy, in a way that is broadly in line with our intuitions, especially if this 
concept has a common-sense interpretation. If we arrived at an interpretation of 
freedom that classifies some intuitively clear cases of unfreedom as instances of 
freedom, or vice versa, this would be suspect. For example, G.A. Cohen has famously 
criticized Robert Nozick’s “moralized” conception of freedom (according to which 
freedom is, roughly, the absence of rights-violating interference) on the grounds that 
it delivers counterintuitive judgments, such as that a justly imprisoned criminal is not 
unfree (G. A. Cohen 1988). Similarly, we would be disturbed if our interpretation of 
democracy classified some clear-cut cases of tyranny as democratic. In such cases, we 
would either have to give strong reasons for overruling our intuitive judgments or 
search for a better interpretation of the concept. Later, we discuss Rawls’s method of 
reflective equilibrium, which may help us adjudicate cases in which our theoretical 
conclusions conflict with our intuitive judgments (Rawls 1971/1999; Daniels 2013). 
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Playing the right normative, evaluative, or descriptive role: We may be interested in a 
concept because we wish to use it in some normative or evaluative principle or in 
some explanation in political science. A good interpretation of the concept is one that 
successfully plays the intended normative, evaluative, or descriptive role. Different 
roles might require different interpretations of the concept. For example, if we want 
the concept of justice to offer a comprehensive picture of how society should be 
organized, we are likely to develop a thicker account of it than if we understand 
justice as one value among the many that should guide institutional design (Rawls 
1971/1999; G. A. Cohen 2008, 271–272). However, to avoid a proliferation of rival 
interpretations of the same concept, we might also be looking for a single 
interpretation that can successfully play multiple roles. 
Standing in the right relationship to other concepts: Since we typically employ 
concepts not in isolation but in connection with other concepts, we may require these 
concepts to be related to each other in the right way. If we take rights to entail 
obligations, for example, our interpretation of rights may constrain the way in which 
we can consistently interpret obligations. Sometimes we may wish some concepts to 
be directly inter-definable. It is often held, for instance, that the concept permissibility 
must be definable in terms of the corresponding concept obligatoriness and vice-
versa: it is permissible that p if and only if it is not obligatory that not p. 
Consequently, our joint analysis of permissibility and obligatoriness must respect this 
constraint. Finally, we may wish some given concepts to be sufficiently 
“differentiated” from one another, in order to avoid redundancies or confusions. (For 
a related discussion of concept formation in the social sciences, see Gerring 1999.) 
Having defining conditions that are neither too “thick” nor too “thin”: Even when 
we have settled the domain of a given concept (e.g., we focus on a concept of freedom 
whose domain is a set of acts, as opposed to a set of agents or institutional 
arrangements), we might still be divided over the concept’s defining conditions. In the 
case of freedom, a huge variety of different defining conditions have been proposed 
(for overviews, see Carter 2012; Lovett 2013). To narrow down the range of 
possibilities, we might require that the defining conditions be neither too “thick”, nor 
too “thin”: they should not refer to any “irrelevant” facts about the objects to be 
categorized, but refer to all “relevant” facts. There can then be debates about which 
facts are or are not relevant and what counts as too “thick” or too “thin”. For example, 
a concept is moralized if its defining conditions refer to some normative or evaluative 
facts. A concept is non-moralized otherwise.5 Nozick’s above-mentioned concept of 
freedom as the absence of rights-violating interference is moralized in this sense. 
Political theorists are often divided over which concepts in political theory should be 
moralized. Similarly, a concept is modally demanding if its defining conditions refer 
not only to facts about the actual world but also to facts about other possible worlds – 
i.e., facts about what would be or might be, not merely about what is. A concept is 
modally undemanding otherwise. Pettit, for instance, argues that freedom is modally 
demanding: a slave with a benevolent, non-interfering master still counts as unfree, 
because there is a nearby possible world in which the master interferes (Pettit 1997). 
Similarly, concepts such as security and peace are arguably modally demanding, 
referring not only to the absence of relevant harmful actions or military conflicts in 
                                                
5 The definition of moralized and non-moralized concepts requires suitable adjustments if there are no 
evaluative or normative facts. 
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the actual world but also their continued absence in a range of nearby possible worlds. 
Political theorists are divided over which, if any, concepts should be modally 
demanding (see, e.g., Pettit 2011; Southwood 2013). 
Having defining conditions that are epistemically accessible: Depending on the 
intended use of a concept, we may require its defining conditions to be such that it is 
possible, at least in principle, for us to know whether an object meets them. For 
example, a concept of welfare whose defining conditions refer to certain kinds of 
mental states that are inaccessible to any observer would be of little practical use. 
Similarly, the defining conditions of justice under Robert Nozick’s account, which 
refer to the entire history of transactions leading to the current distribution of 
entitlements, fail to meet this desideratum and thus render Nozick’s account 
somewhat practically inert (Nozick 1974). Of course, the context and intended use 
may determine what counts as epistemically accessible.  
2.4 What concepts are not 
Concepts should not be confused with principles or theories – the topic of Sections 3 
and 4. In particular, principles and theories have propositional content and may be 
true or false, while concepts, by themselves, cannot be true or false. They only 
categorize objects and, in doing so, can be more or less useful, more or less plausible, 
and more or less in line with established use or with our considered judgments.6 To 
give a simple illustration from outside political theory, the concepts red, green, or 
triangular are neither true nor false. Only statements in which they occur can have 
truth-values, such as “tomatoes are red” (true), “snow is green” (false), and 
“rectangles are triangular” (false).   
Even if we have a full account of when a political system is democratic or what it 
means for someone to be free, this still leaves open the question of whether 
democracy or freedom are desirable and whether we ought to promote each of them. 
We need principles or theories – making statements such as “we ought to respect 
freedom” or “we ought to make decisions democratically” – to address the latter 
questions. Such principles or theories are then capable of being true or false. Simply 
put, concepts can serve as building blocks of principles, which can serve as building 
blocks of theories.  
Still, people sometimes say things such as “freedom as non-interference is the true 
conception of freedom”. Assertions of this kind are best interpreted as abbreviations 
for claims such as “freedom as non-interference is the conception of freedom that is, 
in some relevant sense, most appropriate”, which, in turn, could mean that it best 
captures our established use of freedom or alternatively our considered judgments 
about what counts as free. Literally, however, the claim that one concept of freedom 
is the true one is not meaningful, since only things with propositional content can 
have truth-values. Concepts do not have propositional content: the extension of a 
                                                
6 Recall that the defining conditions of any concept simply specify when an object falls under the 
concept, not whether the concept is true or false. 
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concept is not a set of possible worlds (which is what the extension of a proposition 
is), but a set of objects.7  
Even on the above-mentioned charitable interpretation in terms of appropriateness, 
the assertion “freedom as non-interference is the true conception of freedom” is 
ambiguous. As noted, it would have to be understood as implying that, among the 
many different interpretations of freedom, one stands out as “most appropriate”. But, 
unless we specify a criterion of appropriateness, there is no unique such 
interpretation. For example, one interpretation may be most in line with our common-
sense use of the word “freedom”, another most in line with our considered judgments 
about what counts as free, a third most suitable for playing a particular role in a theory 
of justice. Different criteria of appropriateness may diverge, and there is no 
application-independent criterion. Thus expressions such as “the true conception of 
freedom” are, at best, shorthand for more elaborate expressions involving criteria of 
appropriateness. To avoid ambiguity, it is best to spell those out explicitly. 
3. Principles and theories in political theory 
While analytic political theory until the early 1970s was primarily concerned with the 
analysis of concepts, John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971/1999) invigorated the 
quest for theories and the principles underlying them. Rawls formulated some 
principles of justice, which are the basis of his theory of how we should organize the 
“basic structure of society”, namely its main political, legal, and economic 
institutions.  
In this section, we discuss the notions of principles and theories. Although these are 
widely used in political theory, they are seldom carefully defined. We hope, therefore, 
that our discussion will be clarifying.  
3.1 What is a principle? 
A principle is a statement – a proposition expressed in language – that applies, at least 
potentially, to more than one case. Usually, this is marked by the occurrence of 
expressions with appropriate quantifiers, such as “for all X, subject to certain 
conditions, Y is the case”. A principle is evaluative if it has evaluative content; for 
instance, it includes evaluative predicates or concepts such as good or bad, better or 
worse, desirable or undesirable. A principle is normative if it has normative content; 
for instance, it includes deontic operators such as ought, may, permissible, obligatory, 
right, or wrong. A principle without any evaluative or normative content is positive. 
Such principles are common in the sciences; think of the principle of conservation of 
energy in physics. 
Classic examples of normative principles are the Ten Commandments from the Bible, 
the Golden Rule (“You should treat other people in the way in which you would like 
them to treat you”), Bentham’s principle of utility (“An action is right if it maximizes 
total utility”), and more recently Rawls’s principles of justice. Roughly speaking, 
these state that each person is entitled to the most extensive system of individual 
                                                
7 Note that the extension of a statement or proposition is the set of those possible worlds in which the 
statement or proposition is true. 
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liberties, compatible with a similar system for everyone else (the “equal-liberty 
principle”); and socio-economic inequalities are permissible if and only if they are 
compatible with a system of fair equal opportunities (the “fair equality of opportunity 
principle”) and benefit the least well-off members of society (the “difference 
principle”) (Rawls 1971/1999).  
The propositional content of a principle is the set of all its implications. Sometimes 
this propositional content may depend on auxiliary assumptions. As already noted, 
their having propositional content sets principles apart from concepts, which merely 
offer categorizations. 
3.2 What is a theory? 
The word “theory” is commonly used in two distinct senses. First, it can refer to an 
entire academic field or area of enquiry, such as when we speak of “political theory” 
or “economic theory” as general areas to which curricula or scholarly journals are 
devoted. Second, the word can refer to a specific theory within such an area, such as 
Rawls’s theory of justice, the theory of the firm in economics, or Newton’s theory of 
physics. Our focus here is on theories in this second, specific sense. Surprisingly, 
there exists no canonical definition of a theory in that sense in political theory. 
To provide a starting point, we propose a simple definition inspired by the philosophy 
of science but adapted to the present context.8 We define a theory as a set of 
statements – propositions expressed in language – which is a candidate for playing 
some theoretical or practical role and which is, ideally, representable as the set of all 
implications of some underlying principles. The set of principles from which the 
theory can be derived – if there is such a set – is called the theory formulation.  
Although loose and abstract, this definition has some merits. First, it allows us to view 
positive theories (in the sciences) and normative or evaluative theories (in moral 
philosophy or political theory) as instances of the same general category. Second, it 
makes transparent the differences between them. For example, the roles played by 
theories can range from descriptive, explanatory, and predictive (in the case of 
positive theories) to evaluative and prescriptive (in the case of evaluative or 
normative theories). Third, the definition allows us to identify the special challenges 
that arise when we construct and assess normative or evaluative theories.  
Paradigmatic examples of theories according to our definition are Newton’s theory of 
physics and Rawls’s theory of justice. Each can be viewed as a set of statements, 
entailed by some underlying principles, which can play a descriptive, explanatory, or 
prescriptive role. Newton’s theory is the set of all statements entailed by Newton’s 
principles of physics, perhaps together with some empirical premises about the solar 
system or other physical systems of interest. It can be used, for instance, to explain 
and predict the trajectory of the planets around the sun and to guide such engineering 
                                                
8 We here follow broadly what is often called the syntactic approach to defining theories (where a 
theory is defined as a set of sentences/propositions with certain properties); it is arguably the most 
conventional approach. For a classic exposition, see Quine (1975). It is also worth exploring the rival 
semantic approach (where a theory is defined as a set of models with certain properties), but given 
space constraints, we set this aside here (see van Fraassen 1980). For an introduction to the philosophy 
of science, see Okasha (2002). 
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projects as travelling to the moon and safely back. Rawls’s theory is the set of all 
statements entailed by Rawls’s principles of justice, perhaps together with some 
empirical premises about relevant social conditions. It can play a prescriptive or 
normative role, guiding us in the design of social institutions (for an earlier discussion 
of the relationship between normative and positive theories, see McDermott 2008). 
For our purposes, the biggest structural difference between Newton’s and Rawls’s 
theories is that one is positive and the other normative. Indeed, the principles 
underlying Newton’s theory are positive principles, while those underlying Rawls’s 
are normative ones. Generally, a theory is positive if it has no evaluative or normative 
content; it is evaluative or normative if it has such content. Evaluative theories that 
offer evaluations of “goodness” or “betterness” are also called axiological.   
Earlier, we associated evaluative content with the occurrence of evaluative predicates 
or concepts, such as good, better, desirable, and so on, and normative content with the 
occurrence of deontic operators, such as ought, may, and so on. Different accounts of 
what qualifies as evaluative or normative content can be given, and we need not 
commit ourselves to one such account here. On any reasonable account, Rawls’s 
theory will come out as normative and Newton’s theory as positive.  
While Newton’s and Rawls’s theories are paradigmatic instances of our definition, a 
theory need not be self-consciously theoretical. A set of rough and informal principles 
describing how ordinary objects behave when pushed, dropped, or thrown can 
constitute a “folk” theory of motion that is predictively useful in everyday contexts. 
Similarly, a set of basic principles describing how animals respond to noise, 
movement, and the presence of humans may constitute a simple predictive theory of 
animal behaviour that members of hunter-gatherer societies might have used to guide 
their actions. We also routinely employ normative theories without self-consciously 
doing so. For example, a set of simple principles specifying how we should or should 
not treat others may constitute a simple “folk” theory of personal ethics.  
3.3 The distinction between a theory and the support for it 
Our simple definition of a theory is silent on whether the theory is true, useful, or 
good in some sense. A theory that is false, irrelevant, or superseded still counts as a 
theory. Describing something as a theory carries no assessment of its truth or 
acceptability. Thus the most far-fetched and implausible conspiracy theory – for 
example, in science or in history – still qualifies as a theory.  
Similarly, the attempt to downgrade a set of statements by asserting “it is only a 
theory”, as critics of evolutionary theory or global-warming sceptics sometimes do 
when they describe their target, makes little sense. Calling something a theory is 
consistent with its being well-supported and true just as it is consistent with its being 
speculative and even false.  
An important distinction is that between a theory and what is offered in its support. A 
theory, as we have defined it, is distinct from any arguments, evidence, or justification 
given for it. For example, Newton’s actual or hypothetical experiments – such as how 
an apple fell onto his head (though supposedly a myth) – are not part of his physical 
theory itself; they are part of the evidence he had for that theory. Similarly, Rawls’s 
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arguments in support of his principles of justice, such as his original-position thought 
experiment (a hypothetical choice situation in which the parties to the social contract 
must agree on principles governing the basic structure of society), are not strictly 
speaking part of his theory of justice itself. The original-position thought experiment, 
like any physical experiment or any social scientist’s observation, is offered in 
support of the theory in question. Thus Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice, consists of 
the theory itself (everything entailed by his principles of justice), together with 
arguments in support of it (most notably, the original-position thought experiment and 
reflective-equilibrium considerations), comparisons with rival theories (such as 
utilitarianism), and a fair amount of commentary on the theory’s interpretation and its 
applications. This distinction, between a theory and the argument or evidence in 
support of it, will help us clarify some recent methodological debates in political 
theory, about abstraction and idealization, which we discuss in Section 5 below. 
An important task, separate from defining a theory, is therefore to identify the 
requirements for a good, or acceptable, theory, and to spell out how we can assess it. 
4. The assessment of principles and theories 
There are two kinds of criteria that we may use to assess – especially to justify or to 
criticize – principles and theories: “internal” and “external” criteria. The former 
concern the way the principles or theory are formulated and their internal logical 
structure. Criteria such as consistency and parsimony fall into this category. The latter 
concern the relationship between the principles or theory and what these are “about”: 
their normative or evaluative content, in analogy with the empirical or descriptive 
content of a scientific theory. Criteria such as truth or normative adequacy (in analogy 
with truth or empirical adequacy in science) fall into this second category. In this 
section, we discuss the two kinds of criteria (“internal” and “external”) in turn.  
Throughout this discussion, we focus on theories, rather than principles, as the units 
of assessment. This is no loss of generality. We are usually interested, not in 
individual principles in isolation, but in sets of principles that we wish to assess 
together. If we wish to assess a principle by itself, we can view it as a special case of a 
theory, namely a theory that consists just of the principle and its implications.  
4.1 Internal criteria 
Although we have kept our definition of a theory deliberately thin, defining it simply 
as a set of statements that may play some theoretical or practical role and that is, 
ideally, derivable from some underlying principles, we usually want theories to satisfy 
some further requirements. We now discuss several common criteria for assessing a 
theory’s internal structure. Like our definition of a theory, they are inspired by the 
sciences, but apply to normative and evaluative theories as much as they apply to 
positive ones. Some of the criteria are so obvious that they are often left 
unacknowledged; nonetheless, it is useful to make them explicit. 
Consistency: We require a good theory to be logically consistent. Formally, the set of 
statements constituting the theory must be capable of being simultaneously true. An 
obvious reason for requiring consistency is that anything follows from an inconsistent 
set of statements (ex falso quodlibet). Thus an inconsistent set, such as one containing 
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both “p” and “not p”, is of little use, whether for explanatory, predictive, evaluative, 
or prescriptive purposes. By entailing everything, it is too indiscriminate.9 
Deductive closure: We require a good theory to be deductively closed. This means 
that any statement that is logically entailed by the theory also belongs to the theory.10 
The idea underlying deductive closure is that we want to be able to identify a theory 
with everything to which the theory is logically committed. If the theory asserts “p” 
and “if p then q”, for example, then it should also assert “q”. We would consider a 
theory defective if it were committed to the first two statements, but not to the third. 
The way we characterized Newton’s and Rawls’s theories had deductive closure built 
into it, since we characterized each as the set of all statements that are logically 
entailed by the relevant principles. Deductive closure is easy to achieve even when a 
theory is initially given in a form that violates it: we can re-define the theory as the set 
of all statements entailed by the original, non-deductively-closed formulation.11 
Axiomatizability: This requirement is implicit in the final clause of our definition of a 
theory, which says that a theory should ideally be representable as the set of all 
implications of some underlying principles. Formally, a theory is axiomatizable if 
there exists a finite set of principles such that the entire theory can be expressed as 
their body of implications.12 It should be evident from our earlier discussion that 
Newton’s and Rawls’s theories are usually presented in axiomatized form, as the 
bodies of implications of Newton’s and Rawls’s principles, respectively, perhaps 
together with some auxiliary assumptions. An axiomatizable theory can be presented 
in an informative manner, simply by specifying the set of principles from which it can 
be derived. If the theory could only be presented by brute enumeration of all its 
implications – typically infinitely many – there would be no succinct way of 
summarizing its content. A good theory illuminates its subject matter by giving us a 
manageable set of principles – a manageable theory formulation – that encodes the 
theory’s entire propositional content. 
Parsimony: We require a good theory to avoid any unnecessary complexity, and to be 
as simple as possible, in an appropriate sense of simplicity (on simplicity, see, e.g., 
Baker 2013).13 Scientists commonly care about parsimony, often under the label 
“Occam’s razor”, and Rawls, for instance, also emphasizes simplicity as a virtue of a 
normative theory.14 What counts as “simple” may be different from context to context 
                                                
9 Sometimes we may be prepared to lower the bar of consistency, by admitting some “contained” or 
“local” inconsistencies, as in so-called “paraconsistent” logics. Even then, we usually impose some 
weakened variant of a consistency requirement, to rule out those inconsistencies that are too global to 
preserve a theory’s usefulness.  
10 A set of statements is deductively closed if it contains all its implications. 
11 The deductive-closure requirement also highlights, once more, why consistency matters. Since an 
inconsistent set of statements entails everything, deductive closure would force such a theory to consist 
of everything that can be expressed in the relevant language, which would amount to a completely 
uninformative theory. Again, if we were to use a paraconsistent logic, we might weaken the 
requirement of deductive closure but still retain some less demanding requirement in a similar spirit. 
12 See also Quine (1975). Note that any axiomatizable theory is deductively closed. Note, further, that 
logicians sometimes replace the “finiteness” requirement with a weaker “formal decidability” 
requirement; we set these technicalities aside. 
13 Although axiomatizability of a theory in terms of some easily expressible principles is one of the 
marks of parsimony, axiomatizability is not a sufficient condition for parsimony. 
14 In his discussion of why his principles of justice are preferable to utilitarian principles, Rawls says 
that “reasonable risk aversion may be so great, once the enormous hazards of the decision in the 
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and may also depend on what the theory is about. We usually want to find the 
simplest theory able to account for its subject matter. To be illuminating, the theory 
ought to be simpler, for example, than the target phenomenon it seeks to account for, 
as well as simpler than its rival theories. A scientific theory, for instance, should be 
simpler and more succinct than an enumeration of all the empirical facts it seeks to 
explain; otherwise it cannot play any explanatory role. Likewise, a good normative 
theory should be simpler than an enumeration of all case-specific normative 
judgments. The relevant bar of simplicity may be adjusted depending on the theory’s 
subject matter.  
The present list of criteria for the internal assessment of theories is only illustrative, 
not exhaustive, but given space constraints, we now move on to external criteria. 
4.2 External criteria 
We defined a theory as a set of statements that is a candidate for playing some 
theoretical or practical role. Implicit in this definition is the idea that there is 
something the theory is about: any theory is intended to represent, summarize, or 
capture something “outside the theory”. It may capture this correctly, in which case 
the theory is true, correct, or externally valid, or it may fail to do so, in which case it 
is false, incorrect, or externally invalid.  
What exactly a given theory is intended to represent needs to be spelt out further. In 
the case of a physical theory, the answer is relatively straightforward, especially if we 
accept “scientific realism”: it is intended to represent certain physical facts about the 
world, such as facts about how physical objects behave in response to each other (see, 
e.g., Chakravartty 2013). In the case of a normative or evaluative theory, the picture is 
more complicated. If we are realists about normative or evaluative matters, we may 
say that the theory is intended to represent some theory-independent moral facts. If 
we are not realists about normative or evaluative matters, it is harder to specify what a 
normative or evaluative theory is intended to represent (on moral realism and anti-
realism see, respectively, Sayre-McCord 2011; Joyce 2009). 
Yet the very idea of a theory breaks down unless we assume that there is something 
potentially representable by it, however observer-dependent or socially constructed it 
might be.15 If we were nihilists, to take an extreme example of the denial of any 
normative or evaluative facts, we would not be able to engage in normative or 
evaluative theorizing in earnest.  
Thus, in this section, we assume that normative or evaluative theories are truth-apt: it 
makes sense to ask whether they are true – or, some might prefer to say: correct or 
externally valid. We thus accept a form of “cognitivism” about such theories. This 
                                                                                                                                      
original position are fully appreciated, that the utilitarian weighting may be, for practical purposes, so 
close to the difference principle as to make the simplicity of the latter ... decisive in its favour” (Rawls 
1999, 144 emphasis added).  
15 A constructivist might take a theory to represent certain constructed facts. This is consistent even 
with the view that the theory itself is the “vehicle” by which those facts are being constructed. To 
develop that view further, one might draw, for instance, on parallels with Searle’s analysis of 
declarative speech acts (which – roughly – bring certain facts into existence by representing them). See 
Searle (1995). 
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assumption is still compatible with a variety of views about the “meta-ethical” status 
of normative or evaluative judgments. We return to some of these issues in Section 6. 
Granting, then, that there is some standard of correctness by which we can assess 
normative or evaluative theories (an ontological assumption), we still need to know 
how to do this assessment (an epistemological question). We now review several 
methods of testing a theory for external validity. 
Taking intuitive judgments as strict evidence: According to this method, the test for a 
normative or evaluative theory is whether it fits our intuitive judgments about the 
relevant normative or evaluative matters. On this approach, our intuitive judgments 
have the same status as empirical observations in science. In science, a theory is 
empirically adequate if it entails the correct observation statements (see, e.g., Quine 
1975; van Fraassen 1980). Similarly, in moral and political theory, we might call a 
theory normatively or evaluatively adequate if it entails the correct normative or 
evaluative statements. According to the strict-evidence method, these are precisely the 
normative or evaluative statements supported by our intuitive judgments (cf. the 
discussion in Dworkin 1975). Although simple and analogous to familiar scientific 
methods, this method has some problems. First, while we may be confident in some 
of our normative or evaluative judgments, other judgments may be more tentative, 
and in some cases – especially when the issue is less familiar – we may not have any 
firm intuitions at all. Second, our intuitive judgments may be subject to biases and 
framing effects, which may cast further doubt on their reliability. Third, our 
normative or evaluative judgments may not be consistent with one another, or they 
may entail other judgments that we reject on reflection; in such cases, the strict-
evidence method provides no guidance at all. 
Reflective equilibrium: A more refined method of theory testing is the reflective-
equilibrium method. It does not treat our intuitions as independent evidence, prior to 
the theory in question, but requires us to reach a “mutual fit” between the theory and 
our considered judgments. This works as follows. We begin with some initial theory, 
perhaps inspired by our initial intuitive judgments or given by some prima facie 
principles, then consider the implications of the theory and ask whether they are also 
in line with our judgments. If those implications fit our judgments, the process stops. 
It is more likely, however, that only some of the theory’s implications fit our 
judgments, while others do not. We then reassess both the theory and our judgments. 
In some cases, we may decide, on reflection, to revise the theory by changing some of 
the constituent principles, so as to bring the theory in line with the judgments we are 
unwilling to give up. In other cases, we may decide to overrule our judgments and 
embrace the theory’s implications as our new considered judgments. A reflective 
equilibrium is reached when the implications of our possibly revised theory are in line 
with our possibly revised judgments. At least since Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 
reflective equilibrium has been one of the most widely used methods in political 
theory (Rawls 1999, 15–18, 40–46; Daniels 2013). Its details can be spelt out in a 
variety of ways. For example, we may choose the units of assessment more narrowly 
or more broadly. We can either search for a reflective equilibrium involving a 
narrowly specified theory, constituted by a small number of principles together with 
very few auxiliary assumptions, or we can search for a reflective equilibrium 
involving a more broadly specified theory, constituted by a larger number of 
principles and further additional assumptions – which in turn may be interpreted as a 
conjunction of multiple theories, covering a wider domain of issues. Political theorists 
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sometimes speak of “narrow” reflective equilibrium in the first case, and “wide” 
reflective equilibrium in the second (Daniels 2013). Similarly, we may take different 
views on which kinds of judgments – especially whose judgments – should serve as 
input to this method; more on this below. Although the reflective-equilibrium method 
is consistent with the idea that we arrive at our normative or evaluative theories 
through careful deliberation, we may be worried about the possible arbitrariness of its 
outcome, since there may not always be a unique equilibrium. In some cases, we may 
not be able to reach any equilibrium at all (the non-existence problem), such as when 
we theorize about genuine moral dilemmas and vacillate between different theories 
that each fit only some of our judgments while conflicting with others. In other cases, 
there may exist more than one equilibrium, in that we can arrive at different 
“packages” of revised theories and judgments that each have the required “mutual fit” 
(the non-uniqueness problem). Arbitrary factors such as framing effects or the order 
in which we consider different implications of the theory may then affect which 
reflective equilibrium we end up with (the path-dependence problem). 
Thought experiments and intuition pumps: Whether we opt for the strict-evidence 
method or the reflective-equilibrium method, we may sometimes wish to sharpen or 
clarify our intuitions or judgments. Thought experiments and real-world cases can 
serve as useful “intuition pumps” (Dennett 2013; Brownlee and Stemplowska 
forthcoming). Here, we consider some hypothetical or actual scenario that prompts 
strong normative or evaluative judgments. In the much-discussed “trolley problems”, 
for example, we are asked to judge what actions, if any, would be permitted to 
prevent a run-away trolley from crashing into, and killing, a larger group of people, at 
the expense of leading it to crash into, and kill, a smaller group (Thomson 1985). We 
then use these judgments to test our relevant normative or evaluative theories, 
following either the strict-evidence method or the reflective-equilibrium method. The 
usefulness of intuition pumps, especially ones involving highly idealised, 
counterfactual scenarios has recently been the object of considerable controversy in 
political theory (Elster 2011). We return to this issue in Section 5. 
The relevant judgments: Both the strict-evidence method and the reflective-
equilibrium method raise the question of which kinds of judgments, and whose 
judgments, to use in testing our theories. Should we test our theories on the basis of 
relatively spontaneous judgments or on the basis of suitably “filtered” judgments, and 
how should that filtering take place (Rawls 1999, 42)? And should we use the 
political theorist’s judgments (which might be affected by his or her ideological 
views) or society’s (which might similarly be affected by biases), and in the latter 
case, which society should we focus on (Miller 1992; Walzer 1983)? For example, 
while the Rawls of A Theory of Justice arguably followed the former approach 
(relying on the political theorist’s judgments), the Rawls of Political Liberalism 
subscribed to the latter (looking at society) (Rawls 1971/1999; Rawls 1996). 
Specifically, the later Rawls re-interprets his theory of justice as an articulation of the 
ideas implicit in the public culture of liberal democratic societies. The building blocks 
of his account of justice are explicitly “drawn” from, and supposed to be widely 
acknowledged within, the society for which that account is designed. Relatedly, 
political theorists disagree about whether the judgments to which they appeal in 
theory testing should “fit” the particular practice the theory is meant to regulate. If the 
answer to this question is positive, then the exercise of theory construction is best 
seen as an attempt to offer what Ronald Dworkin calls a “constructive interpretation” 
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of existing political practices (Dworkin 1986, chap. 2; James 2005; Sangiovanni 
2008). If the answer is negative, then the exercise of theory construction is best 
understood as an attempt to “discover” particular normative and evaluative truths, 
independently of existing social practices (on interpretation versus invention, see 
Walzer 1987). To illustrate the difference between the two approaches – at least on 
one reading of what sets them apart – consider the following judgment, made 
explicitly in relation to the practice of camping with friends: “we should institute a 
regime of shared ownership” (see G. A. Cohen 2009). On a practice-
dependent/interpretive approach, this judgment should count as relevant evidence 
only in the construction of a “normative theory of camping”, not in the construction of 
normative theories of other practices, such as socio-political relations within the state. 
For proponents of practice-independence, by contrast, all normative or evaluative 
judgments, including the one in question, have cross-contextual validity in the 
identification of what justice or other moral values demand (this point is made in 
Ronzoni 2012; see also Miller 2002).16   
The applied-moral-philosophy method: A final method of justifying a theory in 
political theory is to show that it can be derived from some independently accepted 
moral principles or theory. A committed utilitarian or Kantian, for example, may 
regard a normative or evaluative theory as justified if and only if it can be derived 
from utilitarian or Kantian principles, which are treated as independently given. In 
this vein, Nozick says: “Moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of, 
political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what 
they may do through the apparatus of the state, or do to establish such an apparatus” 
(Nozick 1974, 6; see also Otsuka 2003, 3). Those theorists who view political theory 
as a subfield of moral philosophy will find this method appropriate. (Works in which 
political theory is conducted – at least to some extent – as applied moral philosophy 
include Singer 1972; G. A. Cohen 2008; Fabre 2012.) By contrast, if we consider the 
activity of political theory to take place against the background of (reasonable) 
pluralism about moral matters, the applied-moral-philosophy method is problematic, 
since it relies on the acceptance of a specific moral theory (for a critique of the 
“applied moral philosophy” approach, see Williams 2005; see also Galston 2010). 
5. Abstraction and idealization in political theory 
In political theory, as well as in other disciplines, theories are often abstract and/or 
idealised in certain respects. In this section, we explain what this means and discuss 
some methodological issues raised by abstraction and idealization. 
5.1 Defining abstraction and idealization 
Broadly following Onora O’Neill (1996, chap. 2), we say that a theory is abstract 
with respect to an issue – represented by a set of statements – if it is silent on that 
issue; formally, it has no implications at all for the given statements, implying neither 
any of these statements nor any of their negations. Newton’s theory of physics, for 
example, is abstract with respect to the colours of the physical bodies whose motion it 
represents. A theory is idealized with respect to an issue – again represented by a set 
                                                
16 The distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence is complex and much 
debated. Due to space constraints, we are unable to explore this complexity here. 
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of statements – if it entails some (simplifying or limiting) falsehood about that issue; 
formally, it has a false implication for some of the given statements, implying one or 
more false statements among them or the negations of one or more true statements. A 
simple Newtonian theory of mechanics, for instance, may be idealized with respect to 
friction, entailing the absence of friction in the physical systems it represents, 
although friction is present in the real world.  
Since theories are meant to simplify the world, most political theorists agree that 
abstraction is virtually unavoidable in theory construction, and an innocuous 
intellectual exercise (O’Neill 1996, chap. 2; see also the discussion in Stemplowska 
2008). Idealization, unlike abstraction, is looked at with greater suspicion in political 
theory and is considered potentially problematic (O’Neill 1996, chap. 2).  
5.2 The worry about idealization 
The “danger of idealization” in political theory has been discussed primarily in the 
debate on “ideal versus non-ideal theory” (for an overview, see Valentini 2012). The 
debate is largely animated by the worry that resort to simplifying assumptions and 
idealized thought experiments or intuition pumps – which are common in 
contemporary political theory – will adversely affect the validity of the ensuing 
theories (see, e.g., O’Neill 1996, chap. 2; Farrelly 2007; Mills 2005). For instance, 
John Rawls develops his theory of justice assuming full compliance with the resulting 
principles. This makes critics wonder whether we can trust Rawls’s principles to 
deliver correct and action-guiding prescriptions for the real world, where many people 
fail to abide by the demands of justice. 
In assessing this worry, two points are worth making. First, like abstraction, some 
degree of idealization in our theories – in the form of simplifying assumptions – may 
play an important, and justified, heuristic role. Again, Newton’s theory of physics 
does not appear to be significantly undermined by its assuming friction away, 
especially to the extent that information about friction can potentially be re-introduced 
in refinements or applications of the theory. This suggests that, rather than reject 
idealizations as problematic from the outset, we must ask whether a theory contains 
the “right” idealizations, given its purpose (Robeyns 2008; Valentini 2009).  
Second, to answer the question of which idealizations are “right” and which are not, 
we need to distinguish between three possible loci – or levels – at which idealizations 
can occur: (1) the theory itself, (2) the conditions of application of the theory’s 
prescriptions (where those prescriptions are of the form “if such-and-such conditions 
hold, then such-and-such follows”), (3) the justification of the theory. Crucially, 
idealization at any one of these levels need not entail idealization at any of the others.  
5.3 Rawls’s theory as an example 
Rawls’s theory of justice, as described earlier, consists of the “equal liberty” (X), “fair 
equality of opportunity” (Y), and “difference” (Z) principles and their implications. 
The theory itself would be idealized – a level (1) idealization – if and only if these 
principles entailed false statements about their subject matter – for instance, if the 
statement “we ought to re-arrange the tax system so as to benefit the worst off as 
much as possible” were false. Note, however, that the often-criticized “idealized” 
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assumption of full compliance is not made within the theory itself, but occurs as part 
of the justification that Rawls offers for the theory. It is one of the assumptions made 
by the parties in the original-position thought experiment. So, it is an idealization at 
level (3). Rawls’s principles, which generate his theory, do not imply any false claims 
about full compliance; hence we have no idealization at level (1) here. Nor do the 
prescriptions following from these principles presuppose full compliance for their 
applicability; hence we have no idealization at level (2) either (see Simmons 2010, 9–
10 for discussion).  
Similarly, consider Rawls’s assumption that society exists under favourable historical 
and social conditions. Relative to existing war-torn, or desperately poor countries, this 
assumption is clearly false: it is an idealization. Rawls says explicitly that his 
principles of justice may not apply to societies in which the relevant favourable 
conditions are absent (Rawls 1999, 216). Does this make Rawls’s theory idealized – 
an idealization at level (1) – and problematically so? Arguably, it does not, because 
the favourable-conditions idealization operates at the level of the conditions of 
application of the theory’s prescriptions, i.e., at level (2). The prescription that is 
entailed by the theory (under a careful formulation) – namely “if favourable 
conditions hold, justice demands X, Y, and Z” – is still true. Although the conditional 
nature of this prescription limits the scope of application of the theory, it does not 
make the theory itself idealized, by generating false prescriptions.  
5.4 The worry reassessed 
We suspect that, although worries about idealization in political theory are frequently 
expressed as complaints about “theories being idealized”, they actually tend to target 
idealizations at levels (2) and (3), rather than (1) – i.e., at the levels of the theories’ 
conditions of application and the justifications offered for those theories, not at the 
level of the theories themselves.  
Of course, idealizations at levels (2) and (3) often make the target-theories somewhat 
irrelevant to the real world, by rendering them insufficiently action-guiding in real-
world circumstances. While this lack of guidance may be a genuine shortcoming, it is 
not accurately captured by the claim that the theories themselves are idealized. 
Rather, in the case of a level (2) idealization, the theories entail true prescriptions of 
an “if-then” sort, whose antecedent conditions – the “if” clauses – do not hold in real-
world circumstances. And in the case of a level (3) idealization, the theories may be 
insufficiently justified, in that the justifications offered for them – such as highly 
contrived thought experiments – are too idealized to allow inferences for the real 
world. 
Our discussion highlights the importance of clarity about the role that idealizations 
play in the defence and formulation of one’s theory. Consider a theory of justice 
prescribing “p”, defended on the assumption that there is no reasonable disagreement 
about justice within society, and yet formulated in universal terms: “justice always 
demands that p”. This theory does indeed run the risk of being problematically 
idealized, if it turns out that the presence of reasonable disagreement makes a morally 
relevant difference to what justice demands. The theory, in that case, would have false 
implications in a number of situations, namely those involving reasonable 
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disagreement. A true principle, by contrast, would only say: “if there is no reasonable 
disagreement, justice demands that p”. 
6. The significance of disagreement in political theory 
We noted earlier that, while political theory is sometimes viewed as a subfield of 
moral philosophy, another view is that political theory is distinct from moral 
philosophy in that the conditions of theorizing are different (see, e.g., Williams 2005; 
Larmore 2013). On this view, political theory, unlike – or much more than – moral 
philosophy, is conducted against the background of (reasonable) pluralism in society. 
Disagreement about normative and evaluative matters, it is said, has a different status 
in political theory than in (mainstream) moral philosophy. The nature of disagreement 
in society constrains what normative or evaluative principles can be defended in 
political theory. In this section, we explore this view and discuss its methodological 
implications. 
6.1 Disagreement: “constitutive of assertability conditions” rather than “epistemic” 
While moral philosophers seek to answer questions such as “what ought we to do in a 
given situation”, political theorists are faced with questions such as “what ought we 
do, given that we do not agree about what we ought to do” (see, e.g., Waldron 1999; 
Larmore 2013). At first sight, we might be perplexed by this alleged difference 
between political theory and moral philosophy. Are there not equally big 
disagreements in moral philosophy? Practically every well-known moral dilemma has 
the property that different people take different views on how it should be resolved, 
and the question of what one should do in such cases of disagreement arises also in 
the moral realm.  
Yet, the difference between moral philosophy and political theory may be said to be 
the following. In moral philosophy, we commonly (though not universally) make the 
assumption that, among the many different rival normative or evaluative theories, one 
is the independently correct or true theory. The task for the moral philosopher is to 
identify that theory. If we conduct moral philosophy on this assumption, disagreement 
is of a “merely” epistemic kind. There is a fact about what the right answer to any 
normative or evaluative question is; we may just have different beliefs about that fact. 
It is less clear – so the argument goes – whether the same assumption can be made in 
political theory. On this picture, disagreement in political theory may be viewed, not 
merely as “epistemic”, reflecting different beliefs about the same truth, but as partly 
“constitutive” of the correctness conditions – or warranted assertability conditions – 
of normative claims themselves. On this view, whether a normative or evaluative 
theory in political theory is correct (or assertable) depends, in part, on the society in 
which the theory is to be applied, and specifically on the level of reasonable 
disagreement in that society; we define the notion of reasonableness below.  
A key desideratum here is that our theories be, at least in principle, acceptable to 
individuals holding reasonable but conflicting moral views within pluralistic societies. 
What counts as a correct normative or evaluative principle in a society with little 
reasonable disagreement need not always count as correct in a highly pluralistic 
society, where the range of reasonable disagreement is greater. In light of this, some 
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theorists avoid using the notion of truth in political theory altogether, and prefer to 
replace it with other, less loaded notions, like reasonableness or reasonable 
acceptability (Rawls 1996; cf. J. Cohen 2009).  
But what might justify the shift from the “epistemic” to the “constitutive” status of 
disagreement in the political domain? At least two answers are possible. First, the 
shift might be morally justified. On this view, a commitment to respect for persons 
places a burden of “reasonable acceptability” on the principles put forward by the 
political theorist, insofar as these principles may be permissibly enforced against 
individuals, for instance through state action. The idea is that political theory focuses 
on the development of “enforceable rules”, and these rules are normatively 
appropriate – meet the relevant criterion of correctness – only if they are acceptable to 
reasonable individuals to whom they apply.  
Second, reasonable disagreement may be taken to constrain correctness or warranted 
assertability in political theory for pragmatic reasons. After all, most of the principles 
put forward by political theorists are meant to help regulate social life in complex and 
highly pluralistic societies. A normative or evaluative theory that appeals only to 
people of a particular moral persuasion would be of little use in this respect; it could 
not give rise to a durable and stable social order except through autocratic imposition. 
And so again, acceptability to individuals with competing reasonable views may be 
deemed a criterion of correctness of the theory. 
The inspiration for many of the foregoing reflections can be found in John Rawls’s 
second major book, Political Liberalism (1993/1996). We now offer a brief 
discussion of Rawls’s treatment of the relevance of pluralism to political theorizing.  
6.2 The distinction between “political” and “comprehensive” theories 
One of the key innovations of Political Liberalism, compared to A Theory of Justice, 
is Rawls’s insistence on his theory being “political not metaphysical” (Rawls 1985). 
This means two things. First, the theory does not adjudicate all aspects of 
interpersonal conduct (as a “comprehensive” moral theory might do) but concerns 
only the “public” realm (most notably, the basic structure of society). Second, the 
theory is grounded not in any “comprehensive” moral theory (“doctrine”), on which 
there is likely to be deep disagreement in any pluralistic liberal society, but in ideals 
that are drawn from the public culture of such a society. Thus a “political” theory is 
typically (i) restricted to a smaller domain of issues and (ii) less morally and 
metaphysically “loaded” (thereby “thinner”) than a “comprehensive” theory. In 
particular, it refrains from taking a stand on issues that are too controversial. 
For example, a theory of justice that adjudicates all aspects of personal, and not just 
political and social, life would be “comprehensive”, as would be a theory based on the 
metaphysically loaded premise that human beings are morally equal because they are 
created “in the image of God”. Both theories would be the object of reasonable 
disagreement within a pluralistic society. By contrast, a theory of justice that focuses 
on the basic structure of society and is based on a commitment to “citizens’ freedom 
and equality” would count as “political”, since its domain does not “over-reach” and 
its premises are entrenched in the public culture of liberal democracies and arguably 
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shared by individuals holding competing yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. But 
what does the notion of “reasonableness” stand for?  
6.3 The notion of “reasonable disagreement” 
The notion of “reasonableness” is hard to pin down in general, and this is true in 
Rawls’s case as well (for discussion, see Gaus 1996, 131–132; Gaus 1999). In 
particular, the notion may be interpreted in epistemological and/or moral ways. Under 
an epistemological interpretation, something is reasonable if it is consistent with a 
proper use of reason in light of the evidence available. Rawls believes that, because of 
what he calls the “burdens of judgment”, we should not expect agreement between the 
views of different people, even when they are all developed by consistently applying 
the powers of reason (Rawls 1996, Lecture 2, sec. 2). Under a moral interpretation, 
reasonableness refers to a view’s compatibility with certain fundamental normative 
requirements, such as respect for citizens as free and equal, or a commitment to 
mutual justification (Rawls 1996, Lecture 2, sec. 3). This would make views that 
reject such a commitment unreasonable. 
Both interpretations of “reasonableness” have virtues and vices, especially in the 
context of what we earlier called the “moral” justification for deeming acceptability in 
the context of reasonable disagreement an assertability condition for theories within 
political theory. As far as the epistemological interpretation of reasonableness is 
concerned, on the positive side, it offers a compelling rationale for treating only some 
contested views as “worthy of respect”, namely those with a given epistemic 
pedigree. On the negative side, this interpretation potentially allows morally 
repugnant views to count as reasonable, assuming they involve no breach of reason, 
purely epistemically understood. If a necessary condition for the overall acceptability 
of a normative or evaluative theory is that it is acceptable to all individuals with 
reasonable views, an acceptable theory must then potentially appeal even to 
individuals with morally repugnant views, and this may be too much to ask.  
As far as the moral interpretation of reasonableness is concerned, on the positive side, 
it allows us to “filter out” morally repugnant views. But, on the negative side, it does 
so at the cost of referring to substantive values that themselves require justification. 
The suspicion is that, on a moralized interpretation, the “reasonable” simply 
corresponds to the moral commitments that the liberal theorist considers non-
negotiable: it is ad hoc (see Mouffe 2005). Again, we do not take a stand on this, but 
note that these difficulties threaten the plausibility of defining the overall acceptability 
of a normative or evaluative theory simply in terms of its acceptability to all 
individuals with reasonable views; identifying those reasonable views may itself rely 
on moral premises. 
6.4 The quest for an “overlapping consensus” 
Finally, turning to the “pragmatic” justification for taking disagreement to have a 
“constitutive” rather than purely “epistemic” status in political theory, we conclude 
with some remarks on Rawls’s notion of an “overlapping consensus”. An overlapping 
consensus on a normative or evaluative theory in a social or political domain occurs 
when this theory is endorsed from the perspective of different reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines held in society. A normative theory that cannot be endorsed 
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from different such perspectives could not hope to gain sufficient support and to offer 
a stable basis for social organization in pluralistic liberal democracies (Rawls 1996, 
Lecture 4). The notion of an overlapping consensus operationalizes the idea that the 
criterion of correctness of a “political” theory is its acceptability to individuals who 
hold competing but reasonable comprehensive moral theories. 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have reviewed the methodology of analytic political theory from what we hope is 
a somewhat novel and helpful angle. By drawing on ideas from the philosophy of 
science, we have attempted to highlight the ways in which theorizing in political 
theory relates to theorizing in other areas of philosophy and positive science. We have 
also reviewed some recent debates and controversies within the political-theory 
literature, which has only recently given greater attention to methodological 
questions. Our hope is that this article will prove to be a clarifying contribution to the 
growing methodological debate in political theory.   
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